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A CASE AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE
RESTRAINT: DECLARATORY STATUS
ORDERS UNDER THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT OF 1940
Roger W. Kappt and Robert M. Hart*
The declaratory order has long promised to be a significant
administrative resource, offering a flexible and efficient means for
administrative agencies to resolve uncertainties within their
jurisdiction, thereby promoting prompt and uniform application of
the statutes they administer. In a recent decision,' the Securities
and Exchange Commission declined to entertain a third party's
application for a declaratory order determining an issuer's status
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, apparently due to the
Commission's reservations about the jurisdictional bases for the
proceeding and the administrative efficiency of declaratory status
orders. This Article examines the Commission's authority and
responsibility with respect to declaratory status proceedings under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.2The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"),
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission"), creates a comprehensive pattern of regulation for
investment companies. The term "investment company" is defined
in section 3(a) of the 1940 Act.3 Application of the standards set
t Member of the New York Bar; B.A. 1958, Queens College of the City of New York;
J.D. 1961, University of Michigan Law School.
t Member of the New York Bar; A.B. 1966, Marist College; J.D. 1969, Duke University
School of Law.
In re Loews Corp., application of CNA Financial Corp. (SEC File No. 812-3667), 74
SEC NEws DIGEsT, Oct. 2, 1974, at 1.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) of the 1940 Act provides three definitions of the term
"investment company": (1) any issuer which "is or holds itself out as being engaged
primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities," (id. § 80a-3(a)(1)); (2) any issuer which "is engaged or proposes to
engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been
engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding," (id. § 80a-3(a)(2)); (3)
any issuer which "is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis," (id.
§ 80a-3(a)(3)). The term "investment securities" is defined in § 3(a) to include "all securities
except (A) Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees' securities companies,
and (C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the owner which are not
investment companies."
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forth therein may require a complex financial analysis and the
resolution of many subjective issues.4 Moreover, the task of
ascertaining an issuer's status as an investment company may be
further complicated by consideration of more than twenty specific
exemptions and exclusions from investment company status and
regulation provided by the 1940 Act.5
Determination that an issuer is an investment company brings
into operation the registration requirements6 and the substantive
regulatory provisions of the 1940 Act.7 Not surprisingly, substantial
uncertainty may exist as to whether a particular issuer is an
investment company. The penalties for operating as an
unregistered investment company make such uncertainty of more
than academic interest.8 Yet registration under the 1940 Act may
not be totally painless itself, since the regulatory provisions of the
1940 Act, which were designed primarily for the protection of
investors in the traditional investment company, 9 may not be
4 See, e.g., SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the general problems involved in
determining investment company status, see Garrett, When is an Investment Company?, 37 U.
DET. L.J. 355 (1960); Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment Company: Section 3(a) (3) of the Investment
Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1959); Kerr and Appelbaum, Inadvertent Investment
Companies-Ten Years After, 25 Bus. LAW. 887 (1970).
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(b), -3(c), -6 (1970).
6 Id. § 80a-8.
7 The 1940 Act prescribes restrictions on such matters as activities and investments (15
U.S.C. § 80a-12 (1970)) and capitalization (id. § 80a-18).
8 Section 7 of the 1940 Act (15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1970)) prohibits an investment company,
unless registered under § 8 of the 1940 Act (id. § 80a-8), from offering or selling any of its
securities, purchasing any securities, engaging in any business in interstate commerce or
controlling any company which is engaged in any business in interstate commerce. Section
42(e) of the 1940 Act (id. § 80a-41(e)) provides, inter alia, that in any action by the
Commission to enforce compliance with § 7, the Commission may request, and the court
may appoint, a receiver. Moreover, § 47(b) of the 1940 Act (id. § 80a-46(b)) provides that
every contract made in violation of the 1940 Act shall be void. Although most of the
substantive restrictions of the 1940 Act are specifically applicable to registered investment
companies, the Commission has consistently maintained that such substantive provisions are
equally applicable to unregistered investment companies that ought to be registered. See, e.g.,
SEC v. The Carter Group, Inc., 74 Civ. 4521 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 18, 1974) (complaint); SEC v. S
& P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 752 n.15 (2d Cir. 1966).
' See Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1967).
As noted in § 1(b), the 1940 Act was enacted in response to the numerous abuses
reported by the Commission in SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies
(1938-40). The Commission's Report
found that to an alarming extent investment companies had been operated in the
interests of their managers and to the detriment of investors. A high incidence of
recklessness and improvidence was also noted. Insiders often viewed investment
companies as sources of capital for business ventures of their own and as captive
markets for unsalable securities that they, the insiders, wished to convert into cash.
Controlling persons frequently took unfair advantage of the companies in other
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compatible with the normal activities of an operating company.' °
ways, often using broad exculpatory clauses to insulate them from liability for their
wrongdoing. Outright larceny and embezzlement were not uncommon. Managers
were able to buy investment company shares for less than net asset value, thus
enriching themselves at the shareholders' expense.
In addition, reports to shareholders were often misleading and deceptive.
Controlling positions in investment companies-represented by special classes of
stock or by advisory contracts-were bought and sold without the consent, or even
the knowledge, of public shareholders. Basic investment policies were changed
without shareholder approval. The advisory contracts themselves were often long
term and either noncancellable or cancellable only upon the payment of a substan-
tial penalty by the company. Sales loads were as high as 20 percent. Management
fees charged in connection with contractual plans sometimes bore no relationship to
any actual managerial services.
Often only a small portion of the first year's payments in contractual plans were
invested in underlying securities for the investor's account. Because of extensive
debt financing, fluctuations in the value of portfolio securities had a disproportion-
ately severe effect on the value of investment company shares; highly leveraged
capital structures made investment company shares extremely speculative and
exposed those who purchased them to extraordinarily high degrees of risk.
SEC, REPORT ON PUBLIC POuCY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1966) (footnotes omitted). The 1940 Act seeks to deal with
those abuses by providing a comprehensive regulatory framework which imposes substantive
restrictions on such matters as the eligibility of affiliated persons and underwriters of
investment companies (§ 9), composition of the board of directors (§ 10), permissible
investments (§ 12), changes in investment policies and fundamental policies (§ 13), minimum
net worth (§ 14(a)), the term and provisions of investment advisory and underwriting
contracts (§ 15), transactions with affiliated persons (§ 17), capital structure and indebtedness
(§ 18), funds available for dividends (§ 19), solicitation of proxies (§ 20), loans (§ 21),
distribution, redemption and repurchase of securities (§4 22-23), accounts and records
(§ 31), the selection of independent auditors (§ 32(a)), and the fiduciary duties of affili-
ated persons of the investment company (§ 36(b)).
11 For example, a company with a number of operating subsidiaries or affiliates may
have difficulty complying with the provisions of § 17 of the 1940 Act (15 U.S.C. § 80a-17
(1970)). With certain exceptions, § 17(a) prohibits an affiliated person of a registered
investment company, acting as principal, to sell any security to such investment company or
any company controlled by such investment company; § 17(e) prohibits the affiliate, acting as
agent, from accepting compensation for the purchase or sale of any property to or for the
investment company or any company controlled by it, except in the course of such affiliate's
business as a broker or underwriter; and § 17(d) makes it unlawful for any affiliated person
of a registered investment company acting as principal to effect any transaction in which
such investment company or any company controlled by it is a joint or joint and several
participant with such affiliated person. In particular, transactions between related companies
controlled by an investment company, such as subsidiaries of the investment company, are
subject to § 17. Some limited exemptions are provided by various Commission Rules.
Commission Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-3 (1974), exempts from § 17(a) transactions
solely between an investment company and one or more of its "fully-owned" subsidiaries,
and transactions solely between two or more of its "fully-owned" subsidiaries. However, a
"fully-owned" subsidiary for the purposes of Rule 17a-3 is a subsidiary all of whose
outstanding securities (other than directors' qualifying shares) are owned by the parent
and/or the parent's other fully-owned subsidiaries and which is not indebted to any person
other than the parent and/or other fully-owned subsidiaries, except indebtedness incurred in
the ordinary course of business and maturing within one year, and indebtedness to one or
more banks or insurance companies. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-3(b) (1974). This narrow definition
of a "fully-owned" subsidiary may make Rule 17a-3 of very limited use for most issuers.
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Consequently, few operating companies would consciously permit
the nature of their activities to change so as to make them
investment companies; operating companies that undergo such a
change are usually referred to as inadvertent investment
companies." Nevertheless, the legislative history of the 1940 Act
evidences careful consideration of the need for substantive
regulation of such inadvertent investment companies and the
abuses sought to be prevented thereby.' 2
If an issuer is concerned that it may be considered an
investment company, it may in certain circumstances seek a
determination by the Commission as to its status pursuant to
section 3(b)(2) of the 1940 Act.' 3 Other persons interested in the
Other 1940 Act Rules may provide an exemption in various types of transactions, but these
Rules generally relate to very limited situations. An issuer could apply to the Commission for
an exemption for any transaction subject to § 17 which is not exempted by a Rule, but since
the Commission does not grant "blanket" exemptions from § 17 (Keystone Custodian Funds,
Inc., 1940 Act Release No. 820 (Nov. 8, 1945)), a specific exemption would have to be
sought for each transaction subject to § 17.
11 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 4, at 30.
12 S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940). As Mr. David Schenker, Chief
Counsel of the Commission's Investment Trust Study, testified:
The third subdivision [section 3(a)(3)] is what we call our statistical formula. The
definition was based upon a very detailed analysis we made of every corporation
which was listed on any exchange in this country. On the basis of our studies and
analyses, we devised this formula, which in essence says that if a company has 40
percent of its assets in securities other than securities of its subsidiaries, they are
investment companies. Curiously enough.., this definition has been in circulation
since the time of our first report in 1938 and no company, virtually no company,
that is not popularly regarded as an investment company, has been caught by this
formula, except possibly one . . . . and I will discuss that in a moment.
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 101 (1940).
13 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1970). Section 3(b) of the 1940 Act (id. § 80a-3(b)) is of
recurring significance. It provides, in relevant part, that notwithstanding § 3(a)(3) of the
1940 Act,
none of the following persons is an investment company . . . (1) Any issuer
primarily engaged, directly or through a wholly-owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in
a business or businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding,
or trading in securities. (2) Any issuer which the Commission, upon application by
such issuer finds and by order declares to be primarily engaged in a business or
businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities either directly or (A) through majority-owned subsidiaries or (B) through
controlled companies conducting similar types of businesses.
Thus, § 3(b)(2) permits an exemptive finding with respect to primary engagement (1)
directly, (2) through majority-owned subsidiaries, or (3) through controlled companies
conducting similar types of businesses, and an issuer seeking exemption by reason of (2) or
(3) must make an application to the Commission. To the extent that § 3(b)(2) authorizes a
finding of "direct" engagement, it overlaps the automatic exception of § 3(b)(1). Moreover,
to the extent that it may be argued that the term "majority-owned subsidiary" is subsumed
within the term "wholly-owned subsidiary," § 3(b)(2) would further overlap § 3(b)(1).
Nevertheless, § 3(b)(2) by its literal terms is available only as a procedure for a Commission
determination with respect to situations involving § 3(a)(3), and is, therefore, of limited
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issuer's possible status as an investment company, such as its
shareholders, 14 companies being acquired by the issuer in a tender
offer, 15 and the Commission,' 6 have sought clarification in the
courts.
Recently, however, in the context of a proposed tender offer, a
target company applied to the Commission for a declaratory order
with respect to the status of the offeror under the 1940 Act. 17 The
target company contended in its application that there was a
substantial question as to whether the offeror and its subsidiaries
were investment companies within the meaning of section 3(a) of
the 1940 Act and thus required to register under section 8 of the
1940 Act. The target company further claimed that if the offeror
were required to register under the 1940 Act, the proposed tender
offer would be prohibited by section 12(d) of the 1940 Act.' 8 In
declining to entertain the application, the Commission stated that if
it did have jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding, such
jurisdiction would be discretionary, and it refused to affirmatively
exercise that discretion.' 9 The Commission also noted that it did
utility for declaratory status determinations. However, it appears that § 3(b)(2) was intended
by Congress neither as a means for issuers to obtain security as to their status under the 1940
Act nor as an overlap of § 3(b)(1). Rather, the legislative history of the 1940 Act indicates
that § 3(b)(2) contemplates a factual situation different from that covered by § 3(b)(1), about
which the issuer would not be permitted to determine its own status. As David Schenker,
Chief Counsel of the Commission's Investment Trust Study, testified in the Senate hearings
on the 1940 Act:
We say that even if you find that more than 40 percent of the assets of a com-
pany are in marketable securities, securities of companies which are not its own
subsidiaries, we still say that it cannot be an investment company, within the
purview of this legislation if-what? If this company i's engaged primarily directly
or through wholly owned subsidiaries in a business other than that of investing and
reinvesting or trading in securities.
Then we say, further, that even if you may fall prima fade within the statistical
formula, if you can prove that even though you do not do your business through
wholly owned subsidiaries but through majority-owned subsidiaries, if you make
out a case that you are engaged in a business other than investing and reinvesting in
securities, you will be exempt.
Hearings on S.3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 177 (1940).
14 See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969).
'" See, e.g., D-Z Investment Co. v. Halloway, CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. 94,771 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
16 See, e.g., SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
17 In re Loews Corp., application of CNA Financial Corporation (SEC File No. 812-3667
(1974)), 74 SEC. NEws DIGEST, Oct. 2, 1974, at 1.
1 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1970).
19 Letter from Allan S. Mostoff, Director, Division of Investment Management Regula-
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not consider the application an appropriate vehicle for
consideration of the issues it raised.
The Commission has expressed doubts in the past about its
authority to determine an issuer's status as an investment com-
pany in any manner other than that specifically authorized by
section 3(b)(2). 20 The Commission's continuing reservations about
its jurisdiction may foreclose the utility of declaratory status pro-
ceedings, whether initiated by third parties, the Commission, or (in
many cases) by issuers. Apart from jurisdictional concerns, the
Commission's response to the target company's application may
simply reflect an unwillingness on the Commission's part to permit
third-party-initiated proceedings. For the reasons discussed below,
however, the Commission does have ample jurisdiction to grant
declaratory orders with respect to an issuer's status under the 1940
Act, and when presented with an application from an issuer or a
third party that raises a patently substantial question about an
issuer's status as an investment company, the public interest would
be served by the exercise of such jurisdiction.
Subject to certain conditions, agencies are authorized by sec-
tion 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act2' ("APA") to issue
declaratory orders "to terminate a controversy or remove uncer-
tainty." Since the section 3(a) definitions include issuers which
propose to engage in the activities described therein, the authoriza-
tion of section 5(d) may in many cases overlap specific or implied
authority under the 1940 Act.2 2 As discussed later, without at-
tempting to delineate the point at which section 5(d) authority
would be necessary to support a 1940 Act proceeding, it may be
seen that the Commission has issued declaratory orders not spe-
cifically authorized by the 1940 Act under section 5(d) of the APA
and/or the general authority granted to the Commission by other
tion, SEC, to CNA Financial Corporation, September 20, 1974 (SEC File No. 812-3667
(1974)).
20 See, e.g., Bankers Securities Corp., 15 S.E.C. 695 (1944); International Mining Corp.,-
12 S.E.C. 174 (1942).
2 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1970). This section was originally § 5(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1964); however, in 1966 as part of the enactment into
law of Title 5 of the United States Code, the Administrative Procedure Act was repealed and
its former provisions with amendments were enacted as 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
Although there appears to be substantial confusion as to the proper form of citation, 5
U.S.C. § 554(e) is herein cited as § 5(d) of the APA.
22 For example, the §§ 3(a)(1) and 3(a)(3) definitions of "investment company" (see note
3 supra) include any company which proposes to engage in the specified activities. Although it
is not clear that a § 3(b)(2) proceeding (see note 13 supra) may be based on purely prospective
facts, the Commission has issued completely prospective exemptions pursuant to § 6(c). See
note 78 infra.
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sections of the 1940 Act, and judicial authority affirmatively en-
dorses the existence and exercise of such authority.
The Commission is mandated by Congress, in section l(b) of
the 1940 Act,23 to administer the 1940 Act so as "to mitigate and,
so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this
section which adversely affect the national public interest and the
interest of investors. 24 To implement this mandate, Congress has
granted the Commission substantial authority. Among its general
powers, section 38(a)25 of the 1940 Act provides, in part, that
[t]he Commission shall have authority... to make, issue, amend,
and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as are
necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred
upon the Commission elsewhere in this subchapter .... 26
In addition, pursuant to section 6(c) of the 1940 Act 27 the
Commission "may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons,
securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
subchapter .... -28 The Commission has construed its power under
section 6(c) to permit the granting of retroactive as well as prospec-
tive exemptions. 29 Thus, since the Commission may absolve any
person from any provision of the 1940 Act, including any prior
violation thereof, the Commission's authority to construe and ad-
minister the 1940 Act is, to a substantial extent, final and exclu-
sive.3 0
Except for section 3(b)(2),31 the 1940 Act does not expressly
authorize investment company status determinations.3 2 Neverthe-
less, absent an express or implied limitation in the 1940 Act, the
clear language of section 38(a), when construed consistently with
23 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1970).
24 Id.
21 Id. § 80a-37(a).
26 Id.
27 Id. § 80a-6(c).
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Great Am. Life Underwriters, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 1 (1960); Hugh B. Baker,
24 S.E.C. 202 (1946).
30 This is not to say that the Commission's authority is unregulated. The Commission is
authorized under § 6(c) to grant exemptions "if and to the extent that such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors
and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this subchapter." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-6(c) (1970). Commission determinations in this regard are, of course, subject to judicial
review. Id. § 80a-42(a).
31 See note 13 supra.
32 The Commission is authorized by § 2(a)(9) of the 1940 Act (15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)
(1970)) to make determinations of "control."
1976]
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the judicial decisions involving general grants of power, 33 would
provide the Commission with authority, either alone or in conjunc-
tion with section 5(d) of the APA, to make such status determina-
tions.
SEC v. Talley Industries, Inc.34 is directly relevant. Talley Indus-
tries argued that the Commission's Rule 17d-135 exceeded the
authority granted by Congress under section 17(d)36 of the 1940
Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held, however, that the "issue must be considered in light of the
general power conferred on the SEC by section 38(a) . . . . " After
analyzing the legislative history of section 17 of the 1940 Act,
Judge Friendly stated that "[w]e thus do not find the legislative
history so compelling as to warrant a conclusion that Congress
meant to deny the SEC power to utilize a method of regulation it had
successfully used in other areas. ' 38 The clear import of the Second
Circuit's analysis is that section 38(a) should be construed liberally
11 See cases cited in note 39 infra.
34 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
35 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-I (1974). For the content of this rule see note 36 infra.
36 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1970). Section 17(d) provides, in part, that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of or principal underwriter for a
registered investment company .... or any affiliated person of such a person or
principal underwriter, acting as principal to effect any transaction in which such
registered company, or a company controlled by such registered company, is a joint
or a joint and several participant with such person, principal underwriter, or
affiliated person, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe for the purpose of limiting or preventing participation by such
registered or controlled company on a basis different from or less advantageous
than that of such other participant.
Rule 17d-1, promulgated by the Commission under § 17(d), provides, in part, that none of
the persons described in § 17(d)
acting as principal, shall participate in, or effect any transaction in connection with,
any joint enterprise or other joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan in which any
such registered company, or a company controlled by such registered company, is a
participant
unless such person has filed an application with the Commission with respect to such
transaction and such application has been granted by the Commission.
37 399 F.2d at 404. Talley Industries also contended that § 38(a) of the 1940 Act is not a
general grant of power. The Second Circuit rejected this contention, stating:
Industries makes a point of the Commission's current effort to have Congress
amend § 38(a) to conform its language to that, e.g., in § 20(a) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, which empowers the SEC "to make, issue, amend and
rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as it may deem necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter .. " See Report of the SEC
on the Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
H.R. Rep. 2337, p. 343 (1966). We find it difficult to discern any truly significant
difference; the Commission's purpose seems to have been to still arguments
spawned by slight variations in the language of the acts it administers rather than to
achieve power theretofore denied.
399 F.2d at 404 n.8.
38 399 F.2d at 405 (emphasis supplied).
238
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unless such construction conflicts with the literal language, or clear
legislative history, of a specific section of the 1940 Act.
The United States Supreme Court has utilized the same
analysis to determine whether an agency's promulgation of a rule
or order not specifically provided for in the relevant statute was
authorized by a general grant of power, such as section 38(a) of the
1940 Act, or was implicitly authorized by the relevant statute. 39
Illustrative in this context is American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,40 which involved the validity of Interstate
Commerce Commission rules governing trailer-on-flat-car service.
A three-judge district court held the rules invalid because the
Interstate Commerce Act4' did not specifically authorize such
bimodal regulation.42 The Supreme Court, in reversing the district
court, held that absent congressional prohibition the Interstate
Commerce Commission should not be denied authority to regulate
bimodal interconnection. 43 Indeed, courts have apparently favored
agency innovation in adapting their procedures to deal with new
situations. 44
Thus it seems that the arguments against the Commission's
jurisdiction to determine an issuer's status under the 1940 Act
are: (1) that section 3(b)(2) of the 1940 Act 45 impliedly limits the
9 See, e.g., FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 624 (1972); Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 n.40 (1968); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956).
40 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
41 49 U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (1964).
42 244 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
43 387 U.S. at 421. See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). While
sustaining the Federal Power Commission's authority to prescribe area rates as opposed to
individual rates, the Supreme Court in Permian stated:
This Court has repeatedly held that the width of administrative authority must be
measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred. . . . Surely the
Commission's broad responsibilities therefore demand a generous construction of
its statutory authority.
390 U.S. at 776 (footnote citing general grant of power contained in § 16 of Natural Gas Act,
15 U.S.C. § 717, which is similar to § 38(a) of the 1940 Act, omitted).
44 For example, the Supreme Court observed in American Trucking that
[i]n fact, although we make no judgment as to the policy aspects of the Commis-
sion's action, this kind of flexibility and adaptability to changing needs and patterns
of transportation is an essential part of the office of a regulatory agency. Regulatory
agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever; they are supposed, within
the limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules
and practices to the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing economy. They are
neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future within the
inflexible limits of yesterday.
387 U.S. at 416.
4' See note 13 supra.
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Commission's jurisdiction to make status determinations to
proceedings initiated thereunder by an issuer; (2) that to the extent
that section 6(c) of the 1940 Act permits status determinations, 46
section 6(c) proceedings may only be initiated by the issuer; and (3)
that as to Commission-initiated proceedings, the Commission's only
recourse in the event that it believes a company is an unregistered
investment company is to commence an action in a district court
pursuant to section 42(e) of the 1940 Act.47
Admittedly, Commission- or third-party-initiated status pro-
ceedings were apparently not contemplated by Congress at the
time of the adoption of the 1940 Act. Indeed, the limited scope of
section 3(b)(2) indicates that Congress did not even give much
thought to voluntary issuer-initiated status proceedings. Certainly
section 6(c) does not specifically authorize status proceedings.
Moreover, although presumably the Commission could exempt an
issuer from the 1940 Act regardless of its status, the Commission
may grant such an exemption only upon a finding that "such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
consistent with the protection of investors .... -48 In any event,
both the statutory procedure whereby some issuers must seek
determinations from the Commission (section 3(b)(2)) and the spe-
cific authorization to bring actions in the district courts (section
42(e)) ought not be construed as an indication that Congress
viewed such provisions as limitations on the Commission's
authority. Neither the Commission's precedents nor the relevant
judicial decisions require sections 3(b)(2), 6(c), or 42(e) to be read
as limitations on the Commission's plenary jurisdiction.49
A similar issue was recently considered by the Supreme Court
46 As mentioned in note 81 and accompanying text infra, the Commission has, in
considering whether an exemption should be granted to an issuer in a § 6(c) proceeding,
considered whether the issuer was subject to the 1940 Act. A finding in.such a proceeding
that an issuer is not an investment company should have the same legal effect as a § 3(b)(2)
finding, i.e., a conclusive finding, absent fraud, that the issuer was not an investment
company on the date involved. This result should follow even though the Commission would
either (1) not have had to make the public interest findings which are a prerequisite to the
granting of § 6(c) exemptive relief; or (2) have denied exemptive relief if it had made such
findings. Thus the Commission's jurisdiction to make such status determinations in proceed-
ings initiated under § 6(c) would have to be based on its general powers under the 1940 Act,
since § 6(c) does not specifically authorize status determinations. While § 6(c) does not define
the persons who may make the application, the language of § 6(c) suggests that it may be
availed of only by the person seeking exemption. In any event, who may initiate a § 6(c)
proceeding is a distinct issue from the Commission's jurisdiction to make status determina-
tions.
47 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970).
48 Id. § 80a-6(c).
4' See notes 37-38 & 60-67 and accompanying text.
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in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.,50 Weinberger v.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 and two related cases, 52 all of which
involved the authority of the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") under the Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetic Act of
1938, 53 ("Food and Drug Act"), to determine whether a drug is a
"new drug" for purposes of the Act.
The Food and Drug Act, as amended in 1962, defines a "new
drug" as one "not generally recognized... as safe and effective for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling .... -154 A "new drug " may not be marketed unless a
new drug application ("NDA") filed with and approved by the FDA
is effective.55 The FDA is specifically authorized to refuse approval
of an NDA or to withdraw any prior approval if substantial
evidence is lacking that the drug is effective for its intended use.56
Prior to the 1962 amendments, many drugs were marketed, for
various reasons, without an effective NDA.57  After having
appropriate studies conducted, the FDA adopted procedures to
determine the efficacy of various drugs, whether or not covered by
an NDA, as "new drugs" under the 1962 amendments.58 Bentex
Pharmaceuticals and its associated cases involved various attacks on
the FDA's jurisdiction to make such determinations,59 the main
contention being that the FDA's only recourse in the event that it
50 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
51 412 U.S. 645 (1973).
52 Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); USV Pharmaceutical Corp, v.
Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973).
53 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
-4 Id. § 3 2 l(p)(1). Prior to the 1962 amendments, "new drug" was defined only in terms
of recognized safety, with no mention of effectiveness. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1958).
55 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970). The FDA is required to approve or disapprove an NDA
within 180 days after it is filed. Id. § 355(c).
56 Id. §§ 355(d), (e).
57 The Supreme Court described the situation as follows:
Between 1938 and 1962 FDA had permitted 9,457 NDA's to become effective.
Of these, some 4,000 were still on the market. In addition, there were thousands of
drugs which manufacturers had marketed without applying to FDA for clearance.
These drugs, known as "me-toos," are similar to or identical with drugs with
effective NDA's and are marketed in reliance on the "pioneer" drug application
approved by FDA. In some cases, a manufacturer obtained an advisory opinion
letter from FDA that its product was generally recognized among experts as safe.
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 614 (1973).
58 412 U.S. at 614-15, 650-51.
'9 Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Ciba Corp., and USV Pharmaceutical Corp. involved
proceedings brought by certain manufacturers in regard to the withdrawal of an NDA.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals involved drugs manufactured by manufacturers who did not have
an effective NDA, so-called "me-too" drugs (see note 57 supra), and was before the Supreme
Court on an appeal of a court of appeals reversal of a district court's referral of the "new
drug" issues to the FDA.
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thought the Food and Drug Act, was being violated was to
commence an appropriate judicial action.60
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the FDA did
not have jurisdiction to declare a drug a "new drug" for the
purposes of the Food and Drug Act.61 In so doing, the Supreme
Court stated in Hynson, Westcott & Dunning:
We hold that FDA by reasons [sic] of § 554(e) [section 5(d)] of
the Administrative Procedure Act may issue a declaratory order
to terminate a controversy over a "new drug" or to remove any
uncertainty whether a particular drug is a "new drug" within the
meaning of § 201(p)(1) of the 1938 Act ....
Its determination that a product is a "new drug" or a
"me-too" drug is, of course, reviewable. But its jurisdiction to
determine whether it has jurisdiction is as essential to its effective
operation as is a court's like power ...
It is argued that though FDA is empowered to decide the
threshold question whether the drug is a "new drug," that power
is only an incident to its power to approve or withdraw approval
of NDA's. Some manufacturers, however, have no NDA's in
effect and are not seeking approval of any di-ugs. Nevertheless,
FDA may make a declaratory order that a drug is a "new
drug."62
Although the factual posture of Bentex Pharmaceuticals and its
associated cases did not require the Supreme Court specifically to
determine that the FDA could on its own initiative issue a declara-
tory order as to a drug not covered by an NDA, its opinions in these
cases leave little room for doubt. The Supreme Court's view is
particularly significant because such FDA-initiated determinations
are not expressly authorized by the Food and Drug Act. Moreover,
the Food and Drug Act, unlike the 1940 Act, does not confer a
general grant of power on the FDA to promulgate orders.63
60 The main contentions, as noted by the Supreme Court in describing the holding
appealed from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (463 F.2d 363 (1972)), in Bentex
Pharmaceuticals were that the
FDA has no jurisdiction, either primary or concurrent, to decide in an administra-
tive proceeding what is a "new drug" for which an NDA is required. In its [the
circuit court's) view the 1962 Act established two forums for the regulation of
drugs: an administrative one for premarketing clearances for "new drugs" or
withdrawal of previously approved NDA's, with the right of appeal; and second, a
judicial one for enforcement of the requirement that "new drugs" be cleared as safe
and effective before marketing by providing the Government with judicial remedies
of seizure, injunction, and criminal prosecution available solely in the District Court.
412 U.S. at 648-49.
61 412 U.S. at 624-27, 643, 653.
62 Id. at 626-27.
63 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) does confer "[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the
efficient enforcement of this chapter."
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the FDA's jurisdic-
tion was necessarily to be implied. The Court reasoned as follows:
Congress has chosen the FDA to administer the Food and Drug
Act;64 the FDA "cannot administer the Act intelligently and ration-
ally unless it has authority to determine what drugs are 'new
drugs' ,,;65 and denial of such declaratory authority would frustrate
the purposes of the Food and Drug Act as amended. 66 The
Supreme Court, in rejecting -the argument that FDA could only
determine new drug issues in a proceeding relative to an NDA,
stated that "[p]arties, of course, cannot confer jurisdiction; only
Congress can do so. ' 67
Although the Supreme Court's focus on the generic nature of
drugs68 may be pointed to as limiting the views expressed by the
Court in Bentex Pharmaceuticals and its associated cases, these cases
clearly sustain the authority of the FDA to issue declaratory orders
with respect to status issues that determine jurisdiction under the
statute it administers. 69 Thus, by analogous application of the
reasoning expressed in Bentex Pharmaceuticals and its associated
cases, there should be no doubt as to the Commission's authority in
connection with status determinations under the 1940 Act, no
matter how initiated.
The Commission has issued declaratory rulings, including
status determinations, in a variety of situations not specifically
authorized by the 1940 Act, through reliance on section 5(d) of the
APA and/or its general powers under the 1940 Act. For example,
in First Multifund of America, Inc.,70 the Commission issued a
declaratory order pursuant to section 5(d) of the APA upon the
joint application of a mutual fund and its investment adviser. The
order determined that the adviser, in purchasing shares (of other
funds) for the mutual fund, from principal underwriters of such
other funds, was acting as a "broker" and, thus, under section 17 (e)
of the 1940 Act,7 ' was entitled to accept and retain commissions
14 412 U.S. at 624.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 626.
67 Id. at 652.
68 USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655, 663-66 (1973).
69 To the same effect is Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956), in
which the Supreme Court held reviewable a declaratory order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission that specified that certain commodities are not "agricultural" and that,
therefore, the carriage of such commodities would not be exempt under the Interstate
Commerce Act. See also Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), which
involved the authority of the Federal Communications Commission.
70 1940 Act Release No. 6700 (August 26, 1971).
71 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970).
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limited to one percent of the purchase price. The Commission also
ruled on related matters concerning sections 17(a) and 22(d) of the
1940 Act.7 2 In issuing the order, the Commission considered
various objections to its jurisdiction and clearly determined that, in
its view, it has authority to issue declaratory orders with respect to
1940 Act matters under section 5(d) of the APA.
Moreover, in section 3(b)(2) proceedings the Commission has
found an issuer exempt from section 3(a)(3) by reason of primary
engagement through a wholly-owned subsidiary, 74 and in the same
proceeding has concluded that it did not have to consider a section
6(c) application by a voting trust whose sole asset was stock of the
exempt issuer, because the voting trust was exempt by reason of
section 3(c)(14) of the 1940 Act.7 15 The Commission has also made
a finding in a section 3(b)(2) proceeding that an issuer is not
an investment company as defined in section 3(a)(1) of the 1940
Act. 76  Indeed, although the Commission has occasionally
questioned its authority to determine investment company status
outside of section 3(b)(2),7 7 the Commission has recognized, even
over the objections of its staff,7 8 the practical necessity and desir-
ability of considering in a section 3(b)(2) proceeding an issuer's
status under all relevant sections of the 1940 Act.7 9
Moreover, denial of the Commission's authority to issue
declaratory status orders except as specifically provided for in the
1940 Act could result in conflicts with the Commission's express
powers. Clearly, either explicit or implicit in every order denying
an application pursuant to section 3(b)(2) of the 1940 Act is a
finding that the applicant is an investment company.80 Many
72 Id. §§ 80a-17(a), -22(d). In addition, the Commission decided questions concerning
§ 26 of article III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. CCH NASD Manual 2176.
73 Cf. Pacific Northwest Power Co., 41 S.E.C. 863 (1964), in which the commission
issued a declaratory order pursuant to § 5(d) of the APA in regard to a company's status as
an "electric utility company" under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 15
U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (1970).
74 Broadway & 58th St. Corp., 12 S.E.C. 1128 (1943).
75 Id. at 1134.
71 United States Foil Co., 9 S.E.C. 22 (1941).
77 See note 20 supra.
78 See Filbert Corp., 15 S.E.C. 667 (1944), in which the Counsel for the Corporation
Finance Division contended that a § 3(b)(2) application should be dismissed because the
applicant was a § 3(a)(1) investment company. (See discussion of § 3(b)(2) in note 13 supra.)
The Commission noted that the "determination of Filbert's status under §§ 3(a)(3) and 3(b)
(2), however, is not a complex matter, and we think it is appropriate in this case to dispose of
the question on the merits." 15 S.E.C. at 669 n.4.
79 See also General Securities Corp., 22 S.E.C. 97, 101 n.7 (1946); United States Foil
Co., 9 S.E.C. 22, 26 (1941).
80 See, e.g., American Ry. Corp., 11 S.E.C. 669 (1942); Atlantic Coast Line Co., 11 S.E.C.
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section 3(b)(2) proceedings involve issuers that, arguably, could
qualify for a section 3(b)(1) exemption, but have chosen to seek a
section 3(b)(2) resolution of their status. For such an issuer,
the section 3(b)(2) inquiry would involve consideration of issues
that are common to those presented by section 3(b)(1), such as
determinations of section 3(a)(3) valuations81 and questions of
primary business engagement directly or' through wholly-owned
subsidiaries. 82 A restrictive construction of the Commission's power
to issue declaratory status orders might permit an unsuccessful
section 3(b)(2) applicant, with an arguable section 3(b)(1) ex-
emption, to refuse to register under the 1940 Act and to contend
that the Commission's authority under section 3(b)(2) is limited, by
the specific language of that section, to declaring that an issuer is
not an investment company.83 If such a contention were sustained,
the Commission might be required to relitigate the section 3(a)(3)
and 3(b)(1) issues in a district court.84 Needless to say, such a
position would emasculate the Commission's functions under the
661 (1942). Illustrative is Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963). Prudential, a
variable annuity account sponsor, applied for an order "declaring that the offer and sale of
variable annuity contracts will not subject Prudential, in whole or in part, to the Act" (id. at
336), or in the alternative for exemptive relief from certain provisions of the 1940 Act. The
application was made pursuant to §§ 3(b)(2), 3(c)(3), and 38(a) of the 1940 Act. The Com-
mission denied the application on the merits with respect to §§ 3(b)(2) and 3(c)(3), but
granted § 6(c) exemptive relief from certain provisions of the 1940 Act. Implicit in the denial
of the §§ 3(b)(2) and 3(c)(3) requests, and the granting of § 6(c) relief, was the conclusion by
the Commission that it could determine whether an issuer is an investment company, a
procedure not specifically authorized by the 1940 Act.
"' See, e.g., Tobacco Prods. Export Corp., 12 S.E.C. 743 (1943). If the issuer seeks the
certainty of a § 3(b)(2) order, its application would most likely concede that it is, or will be, a
§ 3(a)(3) investment company, since, otherwise, the Commission might decline to entertain
the application under § 3(b)(2). See note 13 supra. Such a position might preclude the
issuer's opportunity to subsequently claim that it was not a § 3(a)(3) investment company. Cf.
note 109 infra.
82 See, e.g., Case, Pomeroy 9: Co., 17 S.E.C. 844 (1944).
" The Commission has also exercised its jurisdiction over persons not registered under
the Act to grant "declaratory" orders in the form of prospective complete exemptions from
the 1940 Act pursuant to § 6(c) thereof. In Business Development Corp. of Nebraska, 1940
Act Release No. 5967 (Jan. 30, 1970), the Commission granted an exemption from all of the
provisions of the 1940 Act pursuant to § 6(c). The applicant had been formed for the
purpose of promoting the economic development of the state of Nebraska and proposed to
make a public offering of shares of its common stock. Since the applicant proposed to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percent of its total assets, it would
have been required to register under the 1940 Act, unless granted exemption pursuant to
§ 6(c). Explicit in this prospective exemption proceeding was a finding that the applicant
would have been an investment company. See also Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 1940 Act
Release No. 5981 (Feb. 19, 1970); Bank Fiduciary (Equity) Fund, 1940 Act Release No. 5993
(Feb. 27, 1970).
84 A district court may hold that the unsuccessful applicant is precluded from
reitigating the §§ 3(a)(3) and 3(b)(1) issues. See note 109 infra.
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1940 Act.85 The Commission has also issued declaratory orders
without relying on section 5(d) of the APA with respect to, for
example, sections 18() 86 and 17(d)87 of the 1940 Act.
Although the Commission appears, in effect, to have ample
authority under the 1940 Act to make status determinations by
declaratory order without relying on section 5(d) of the APA, the
Supreme Court's reliance on section 5(d) in Bentex Pharmaceuticals
and Hynson, Westcott & Dunning warrants further examination of
section 5(d) as applied to the 1940 Act.
Indeed, until First Multifund,88 discussed above, the Commis-
sion had expressed reservations as to the availability of section 5(d)
for 1940 Act orders.89 Section 5(d) is by its terms available in every
"case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . ."90 This
requirement appears to be satisfied by sections 40(a) and 43(a) of
the 1940 Act. Section 40(a) provides that "[o]rders of the Commis-
sion under this subchapter shall be issued only after appropriate
notice and opportunity for hearing."91 Section 43(a) 92 of the 1940
Act, which provides for judicial review of Commission orders,
makes several references to a record, clearly contemplating, and
implicitly requiring, the existence of a "record" and determination
thereon. 93
85 See text accompanying notes 118-19 infra.
86 State Bond & Mortgage Co., 1940 Act Release No. 4685 (Aug. 25, 1966). State Bond
& Mortgage Co. involved an application for an order of the Commission that certain stock
options granted by the applicant were not securities for purposes of § 18(j) of the 1940 Act,
or in the alternative for an exemption from § 18(j) pursuant to § 6(c). The Commission
concluded that the stock options were securities. Id. at 4.
87 Talley Industries, Inc., 1940 Act Release No. 5358 (April 19, 1968). Applicants
sought a determination that § 17(d) and Rule 17d-I were inapplicable to the purchase by an
investment company and an affiliated person of securities of a third party or, in the
alternative, a retroactive exemption. The Commission held that the statute and rule were
applicable and denied the exemption sought.
88 1940 Act Release No. 6700 (Aug. 26, 1971).
89 See Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285 (1962), in which it was noted that
[e]ven Section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . would not
empower the Commission to issue a declaratory order in the absence of specific
provisions in Section 2(a)(9) for determinations by the Commission upon questions
of control.
Id. at 297 n.28.
98 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-39(a) (1970).
92 Id. § 80a-42(a).
9' This position is also supported by the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947), which states that, as regards the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970), the "on-the-record" requirement "is clearly implied in the
provision for judicial review of these orders in the circuit court of appeals." ATTORNEY
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However, two recent Supreme Court cases involving section 4
of the APA,94 United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.95 and
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. 96 raise some questions. In
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., the Supreme Court held that
rules issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under section
1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 97 which required that
such rules be issued "after hearing," did not satisfy the "on the
record" requirement of section 4 of the APA (which brings into
operation the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the APA). 98 The
Supreme Court stated:
We recognized in Allegheny-Ludlum that the actual words "on the
record" and "after . . . hearing" used in § 553 [APA section 4]
were not words of art, and that other statutory language having the
same meaning could trigger the provisions of §§ 556 and 557
[APA sections 7 and 8] in rulemaking proceedings. But we
adhere to our conclusion, expressed in that case, that the phrase
"after hearing" in § 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act does
not have such an effect. 99
Although Florida East Coast Ry. and Allegheny-Ludlum suggest that
more than an implied on-the-record requirement may be needed
to trigger section 5(d) of the APA, in its decisions dealing with
section 5(d) of the APA, the Supreme Court has not discussed the
"on-the-record" requirement"0 and has sustained section 5(d) de-
claratory orders in cases where the statute involved did not even
imply an "on-the-record" requirement. 1 1
GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra, at 41. Section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78y (1970), which provides for such review, is virtually identical to § 43(a) of the
1940 Act.
14 Section 4 of the APA provides for public notice of proposed agency rulemaking and
requires the agency to permit interested persons to participate in the rulemaking procedure
by allowing the submission of comments. Section 4(c) provides, however, that "[w]hen rules
are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 [§§ 7 and 8 of the APA] of this title shall apply instead of this
subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). See note 98 infra.
93 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
96 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
97 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970).
96 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556-57 (1970). Sections 7 and 8 of the APA provide for certain
procedural requirements relative to rulemaking and concerning such matters as the conduct
of hearings, burden of proof, evidence, initial decision and agency review.
99 410 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
'00 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960); Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 171
(1959); Boston & Me. R.R. v. United States, 358 U.S. 68 (1958); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
'339 U.S. 33 (1950).
101 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Red
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In Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, one of the companion cases to
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of
the FDA to "make a declaratory order that a drug is a 'new
drug,' "102 despite the fact that the Food and Drug Act does not
provide for such orders, and, therefore, does not provide for an
"on-the-record" determination. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
noted, apparently referring to the declaratory order procedure,
that the "procedure is a permissible one where every manufacturer
of a challenged drug has an opportunity to be heard."'0 3 This is
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath,'0 4  in which the Court held that the section 5
"hearing-required-by-statute" provision was satisfied by reading a
hearing requirement into a statute so as to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process. In none of these cases did the
Supreme Court discuss an "on-the-record" requirement. This lack
of discussion evidently stems from an expectation that orders
emanating from a hearing in an adjudicatory proceeding would be
based on the record of that hearing.' 0 5 Thus, the Supreme Court
appears to apply the "on-the-record" requirement of section 5
(which is applicable to adjudicatory proceedings) different from
the "on-the-record" requirements of section 4 (which is applicable
to rulemaking proceedings),' 0 6 and under the Court's section 5
decisions, the "on-the-record" requirement is met with respect to
orders under the 1940 Act.
Finally, it should be noted that section 5(d) is not available for
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950). In this regard, with reference to the Supreme Court cases involving ICC orders,
Professor Davis has noted:
The ICC is tacitly assuming power to issue declaratory orders under § 5(d),
irrespective of the limitations stated in the introductory clause of § 5, and the
Supreme Court is tacitly approving. Neither the Court nor the Commission has
shown any concern for the limitations in the introductory clause. The result, from a
practical standpoint, is sound, because the declaratory-order power is needed and
useful, and the limitations in the introductory clause were not drafted with
declaratory orders in mind.
K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (Supplement) § 4.10, at 201 (1970).
102 412 U.S. at 627.
103 412 U.S. at 625.
104 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
105 Cf., e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated as
moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949).
106 The distinction was also noted by the Supreme Court in Florida East Coast Ry.:
The term "hearing" in its legal context undoubtedly has a host of meanings. Its
meaning undoubtedly will vary, depending on whether it is used in the context of a
rulemaking-type proceeding or in the context of a proceeding devoted to the
adjudication of particular disputed facts.
410 U.S. at 239 (footnote omitted).
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adjudications that are "subject to a subsequent trial of the law and
the facts de novo in a court."107 As discussed above, status orders of
the Commission are authorized by the 1940 Act; consequently,
such orders would be reviewable under section 43(a) of the 1940
Act, which provides that "[t]he findings of the Commission as to
the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.' 0 8  Moreover, even if section 43(a) were held
inapplicable to declaratory orders or if the issue were raised in a
subsequent collateral litigation between the Commission and the
party affected by the order (i.e., not involving a direct review of
such order), the standard of section 43(a) should be applicable.' 09
The proposition that 1940 Act declaratory orders are subject to
review de novo has also been rejected by the Commission. 110
The Supreme Court's treatment of declaratory orders,
particularly in Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, clearly parts with
traditional views-as to the limitations of section 5 of the APA.11 ' In
107 5 U.S.C § 554(a)(1) (1970).
108 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (1970).
109 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc,,
399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969):
To be sure the case is not here on a petition to review the SEC's order denying
Industries' application for retrospective approval, and the provision of § 43(a)
making its findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence thus is not
applicable by its terms. But the principle underlying that rule-that a factual
determination by an agency responsible for the execution of Congressional policy
and vested with expertise shall not be disturbed by a court where there is substantial
evidence to support it-applies none the less, and it would be little short of absurd
for us to decline to follow the same standard by which a court reviewing the
Commission's order would be bound. Cf. SEC v. Central Illinois Securities Corp.,
338 U.S. 96, 113-27, 69 S. Ct. 1377, 93 L. Ed. 1836 (1949).
399 F.2d at 403. Cf. Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court noted:
Where there is, however, an administrative determination [as to "new-drug" issues],
whether it be explicit or implicit in the withdrawal of an NDA, the tactic of
"reserving" the threshold question (the jurisdictional issue) for later judicial
determination is not tolerable. There is judicial review of FDA's ruling. But
petitioner, having an opportunity to litigate the "new drug" issue before FDA and
to raise the issue on appeal to a court of appeals, may not relitigate the issue in
another proceeding.
Id. at 644 (citation omitted).
110 First Multifund of America, Inc., 1940 Act Release No. 6700 (Aug. 26, 1971). The
Commission stated that its order would be "completely effective without the necessity for
judicial retrial or decision." Id. at 10. In Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, the Supreme Court
noted that § 5(d) was available in a situation where review would be in a district court under
§ 10(c) of the APA (5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970)) (the Food and Drug Act not providing for such
review). 412 U.S. at 626-27. In reaching this conclusion, the Court by implication must have
found that agency orders do not require a statutory aid, such as § 43(a), to make the findings
of fact on which they are based condusive, if supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Ciba
Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640, 644 (1973).
"I1 Cf. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4.10 (1958y.
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those cases the FDA determined on its own initiative that there was
an uncertainty as to the status of various drugs under the Food and
Drug Act and adopted procedures to resolve that uncertainty. The
Supreme Court's affirmance of that procedure was based more on
practical considerations than on an analytical examination of the
relevant statutes. 1 2
Having found implied jurisdiction in the FDA to consider
"new drug" and related issues, the Supreme Court could then find,
as it did in Bentex Pharmaceuticals, that a district court's referral of
such issues to the FDA "was appropriate, as these are the kinds of
issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA.""' 3
Quoting its opinion in Far Eastern Conference v. United States," 4 the
Supreme Court noted:
In cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experi-
ence of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the sub-
ject matter should not be passed over." 5
Although the primary jurisdiction aspects of Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning and Bentex Pharmaceuticals are not relevant to the existence
of jurisdiction to grant declaratory orders, they do bear on the
Commission's responsibility to make declaratory status determina-
tions. The primary jurisdiction doctrine as applied by the Supreme
Court in Bentex Pharmaceuticals and other recent cases 1 6 is clearly
more than a matter of statutory construction or jurisdiction;
rather, it is a pragmatic restraint aimed at achieving an efficient
and rational division of agency and judicial responsibility." 7 As the
Supreme Court has noted:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business en-
trusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited
functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exer-
cised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
112 See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
113 412 U.S. at 653.
114 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
115 412 U.S. at 654.
116 See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973); Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970); Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
117 Primary jurisdiction is generally said to arise only where the courts and the agency
possess concurrent jurisdiction. 3 K. DAvis, supra note 111, § 19.01-.09. But see Ricci v.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that
the Court of Appeals had properly stayed an antitrust proceeding while awaiting a decision
on certain issues in the case by the Commodities Exchange Commission, even though the
CEC had no authority to decide the antitrust issue involved.
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circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are. better
equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.""
Such considerations are especially pertinent to the determina-
tion of investment company status. The courts may have the last
word on matters arising under the 1940 Act, but in view of the
complexity of the regulatory scheme imposed by the 1940 Act and
the Commission's experience, broad powers, and responsibilities
thereunder, the Commission should have the first.119 Such a result
is particularly appropriate since the Commission may decide to
exercise its authority under section 6(c) of the 1940 Act to retroac-
tively or prospectively exempt an issuer which is found to have
been an unregistered investment company.12 0 Indeed, in Natco
Corp. v. Great Lakes Industries, Inc.,' 21 the only case to find that a
target company has standing to question the offeror's status under
the 1940 Act, the district court referred the issue of the defen-
dant's status under the 1940 Act to the Commission. 22
The decision of a district court to refer a matter to an adminis-
trative agency is apparently a matter of discretion, 23 but review-
able discretion. 12 4 Section 5(d) of the APA provides that agencies in
their "sound discretion" may issue declaratory orders; n'evertheless,
such discretion is reviewable. 125 If, therefore, it may be an abuse of
discretion for a district court not to refer an issue of investment
118 Far Eastern Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952) (quoted in
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. at 654).
119 But see Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285 (1962).
120 Cf. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
121 214 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, [1961-64 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,236 (3d Cir. 1963).
122 More recent cases have held that the 1940 Act was intended to protect shareholders
of investment companies, and not to protect target companies, and that, therefore, a target
company does not have standing to assert the 1940 Act violations of the offeror. See, e.g.,
Herpick v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); D-Z Investment Co. v. Halloway, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
123 In USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973), one of the compan-
ion cases to Bentex Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court specifically noted that its affirmance
of a Circuit Court decision on the merits of a "new-drug" issue was "not meant to indicate
that the District Court, had it concluded that its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of
FDA, would not have abused its discretion in refusing to stay this action pending the
outcome of administrative proceedings." 412 U.S. at 659 n.1.
124 Most primary jurisdiction cases have involved the propriety of a district court's
referral. However, appellate courts have on occasion instructed a district'court to refer a
matter to the relevant agency. See, e.g., Watts v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 383 F.2d 571,
586 (5th Cir. 1967).
125 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946); 1 K. DAvis, supra note 111, § 4.10 at
276-78.
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company status to the Commission, would it not be undesirable for
the Commission to decline to entertain an issuer's application or a
third party's application which raises substantial questions as to an
issuer's status under the 1940 Act, or, indeed, to ignore materials
in its files which raise such questions?12 6
The considerations applicable to a Commission determination
to commence a declaratory proceeding would be different than
those applicable to its determination to entertain an issuer's, or a
third party's, application. For example, if the Commission con-
cludes in a particular situation that declaratory resolution of an
issue would be ineffective to redress damages caused by wilful or
serious violation of the substantive provisions of the 1940 Act, it
might commence an enforcement action seeking remedial relief.
Apart from such cases, the Commission might be best advised to
settle questions of investment company status by a declaratory
proceeding.127
A clear example of the unsatisfactory situations that may result
from such enforcement proceedings is the Commission's
nonacquiescence in the district court's findings in SEC v. Fifth
Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., ' 28 in which the district court held that, for
purposes of section 3(a)(3) of the 1940 Act, certificates of deposit
maturing in ninety days or less and a six-month time deposit were
"cash items" and not "investment securities."'2 9 The Commission
had contested this and still has not acquiesced in the court's
holding.' 30 Thus, issuers have before them a district court
126 Cf. Retail Store Employees, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285 (1962).
127 Such proceedings may prove to be a more efficient use of the Commission's resources
and are more likely to result in authority that reflects a consistent, coherent legal framework
that may be relied upon by issuers and their counsel.
1 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
,9 289 F. Supp. at 31-33. The Commission had argued to the contrary. The issue could
be significant for issuers that temporarily have obtained substantial cash, such as the
proceeds of a public offering, and would like to receive a return on those funds pending
their ultimate use in noninvestment activities. The dilemma for such an issuer is that, if it
relies on the district court's holding, the Commission or a dissident shareholder may at some
date claim that the issuer had been an unregistered investment company. As noted in note 8,
supra, the penalties for operating as an unregistered investment company may be severe. Of
course, the alternative would be to adhere to the Commission's position and forego the
possible higher returns generally available from certificates of deposit, by investing the funds
in United States debt obligations, which are specifically excluded by § 3(a)(3) from the
definition of investment securities.
120 In answering a request concerning the Commission's position on the district court's
holding in Fifth Ave. Coach, the Chief Counsel of the Commission's Division of Investment
Management Regulation stated:
[T]he Commission has not acquiesced in the Fifth Avenue holding as it applied to
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precedent, which, however, in the Commission's view, may not be
relied upon.
Issuer applications for investment company status deter-
minations should present the least problems. As shown above,131
despite the Commission's jurisdictional concerns, it has often
granted sueh determinations in section 3(b)(2) and section 6(c)
proceedings. Nevertheless, until clarified by the Commission there
will continue to be uncertainty as to the availability and scope of the
declaratory order procedure.
The most innovative use of declaratory status proceedings
involves third-party-initiated proceedings, particularly proceedings
brought by persons who might not have standing in the federal
courts. For example, virtually all target company suits alleging that
the offeror is an unregistered investment company have been
dismissed 'for lack of standing. 3 2 However, since the judicial
concept of standing would not appear applicable to agency
proceedings,' 3 3  the Commission could entertain third-party
the facts of that case. In this connection please note that the Court of Appeals
indicated that the evidence might have supported a holding that Fifth Avenue
became an investment company at a date earlier than the date determined by the
trial court. However, the Court of Appeals did not decide the issue since the
Commission did not cross-appeal the District Court's holding.... In my view, the
failure of the Commission to cross-appeal on this issue did not constitute an
acquiescence; the Commission had won all major issues in the case and the other
parties were appealing.
Whether or not the Commission would take action for violation of the
Investment Company Act if a company had 40% or more of its assets in certificates
of deposits or time deposits would depend on the facts of the case.
Interpretative Letter, Samuel Lippman (Div. of Investment Management Regulation,
October 19, 1973).
131 See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
132 See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
133 The standing concept evolved out of the jurisdictional requirement of a "case or
controversy." As the Supreme Court has stated, "the question of standing in the federal
courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to
'cases' and 'controversies.'" Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 151 (1970). There is a basic distinction between the role of a court and that of a
federal agency, however. Whereas a court usually limits its inquiries to facts presented by the
parties, and the relief requested by them, an agency need not so limit itself. As the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436
F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
We have previously had occasion to point out that the Federal Communications
Commission was intended by Congress to function as far more than a mere referee
between conflicting parties. Regardless of the formal status of a party, or the
technical merits of a particular petition, the FCC "should not close its eyes to the
public interest factors" raised by material in its files. We have noted that, as a
general matter, the federal regulatory agencies should construe pleadings filed
before them so as to raise rather than avoid important questions. They "should not
adopt procedures that foreclose full inquiry into broad public interest questions,
either patent or latent."
436 F.2d at 254 (footnotes omitted).
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proceedings without concern for the applicant's standing. The
objection would be made, of course, that the target company's
application was merely a dilatory tactic to frustrate the takeover.
The Commission is -capable, however, of quickly evaluating the
substantiality of the issues presented by the application. If the
application were frivolous, it could be dismissed summarily. 13 4
Moreover, as the Commission has noted, it may use its exemptive
power to prevent any hardship that would be imposed by a finding
that an issuer is an investment company.' 35 The Commission would
also have the opportunity to prevent unlawful transactions before
they occur, rather than leaving the situation to be remedied at
some future date. Regardless of the efficacy of remedial relief in
discouraging others from violating the 1940 Act, it is not likely to
restore injured parties to the status quo ante.
A brief analysis of the powers of the Commission to deal with
issuers who refuse to participate in a declaratory status proceeding
initiated by the Commission or a third party and/or refuse to obey
a Commission order in such a proceeding is warranted. The
Commission has ample authority under various provisions of the
1940 Act and section 5(d) of the APA, and sufficient procedural
regulations in its Rules of Practice, 136 to permit it to initiate and
conduct declaratory status proceedings. Section 40(a) of the 1940
Act 137 and Rule VI of the Commission's Rules of Practice' 38
require personal service upon each party to the proceeding.
Section 42(b)' 39 empowers the Commission to subpoena witnesses
and requires the production of documents for the purpose of any
proceeding under the 1940 Act. Although the Supreme Court has
noted that a party's willingness to participate is not determinative
of jurisdiction, 140 section 42(c) of the 1940 Act 14 1 specifically
authorizes the Commission to invoke the aid of the federal courts
in the case of contumacy, and further provides that willful failure
to obey a subpoena of the Commission is punishable by fine and/or
imprisonment. Similarly, once the Commission issues a declaratory
order finding an issuer to be an investment company, the failure of
134 See Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285, 294 (1962).
135 id. at 294-95.
13 SEC Reg. 201.11, 17 C.F.R. § 201.11 (1974).
137 15 U.S.C. § 80a-39(a) (1970).
138 SEC Reg. 201.6(b), 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(a)-(b) (1974).
139 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(b) (1970).
140 Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); see text accompany-
ing note 67 supra.
141 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(c) (1970).
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the issuer to register- as such could warrant the use of the criminal
sanction of section 49142 of the 1940 Act intended to penalize a
willful violation of an order of the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has ample jurisdiction under the 1940 Act
and section 5(d) of the APA to make investment company status
determinations in proceedings initiated by issuers, third parties, or
the Commission itself.
The. Commission's sweeping responsibilities under the 1940
Act strongly suggest that the Commission should be the forum in
which questions of investment company status are first considered;
in many instances, the Commission may be the only forum in which
such issue may be raised. The public interest is not served by the
Commission's reluctance to exercise its authority to entertain status
proceedings. The Commission ought to reconsider its jurisdiction
to make status determinations under the 1940 Act and reconsider
the suitability of its Rules of Practice as applied to such proceedings
and should, to the extent necessary, clarify or modify its Rules so as
to accommodate such proceedings.
142 Id. § 80a-48.
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